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State bureaucrats and local influence 
on the use of military troops 
for maintenance of public order 
in France and Prussia, 1889-1914 
Anja Johansen1 
Cet article compare les politiques divergentes de l'Empire allemand et de 
la Troisième République française en ce qui concerne le recours à l'armée, 
dans le domaine du maintien de l'ordre en cas de manifestation ou de conflit du 
travail, entre 1889 et 1914. Il soulève le point de savoir si l'utilisation crois-
sante de la troupe durant cette période en France tient à l'incapacité du gou-
vernement central et des autorités départementales à contrôler l'utilisation par 
les municipalités de leur droit à requérir l'armée. L'article analyse le proces-
sus de prise de décision relatif à la réquisition des troupes et les relations entre 
les dirigeants de l'État, les groupes de pression locaux et les élites industrielles 
dans deux des régions industrielles les plus turbulentes : la province prussienne 
de Westphalie et la région française du Nord-Pas-de-Calais. Il conclut que les 
préfets étaient tout aussi capables et désireux que leurs homologues westpha-
liens de contrôler strictement les autorités municipales en matière d'interven-
tion de l'armée pour le maintien de l'ordre. L'usage extrêmement fréquent de 
celle-ci en France ne peut donc être attribué à la faiblesse du gouvernement 
central et de son administration à l'égard des pouvoirs locaux. 
The article compares the diverging policies in imperial Germany and in 
France under the Third Republic, between 1889 and 1914, of calling upon the 
army to police protest and labour conflicts. It asks whether the increasing use 
of military troops in France during this period reflects the inability of the 
French central government and departemental administration to control 
municipal authorities' use of their right to call upon the army. The article pre-
sents an analysis of the decision-making process concerning the requisition 
of troops as well as the relationship between the leaders of the state adminis-
tration with local pressure groups and industrial elites in the two most turbu-
lent industrial areas : the Prussian province of Westphalia and the French 
region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais. The article concludes that the French prefects 
were just as capable and willing as their Westphalian counterparts of keeping 
municipal authorities under strict control when it came to using the army as 
a force of internal order. The extremely frequent use of troops in France can 
therefore not be attributed to the weakness of the position of central govern-
ment and its administration in relation to local forces. 
Anja Johansen defended her doctoral dissertation in Modern History on Bureaucrats, Generals, and 
the Domestic Use of Military Troops: Patterns of civil-military Co-operation Concerning 
Maintenance of Order in French and Prussian Industrial Areas, 1889-1914 at the European 
University Institute in Florence in April 1999. She currently holds the post of Research Fellow at 
Glare Hall, Cambridge and is preparing her doctoral thesis for publication. 
This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the European Social Science History 
Conference (Amsterdam, March 1998). It is partly based on my doctoral thesis (Johansen, 1998). 
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One of the main themes of on-going research on policing in Western Europe is the process of de-militarisation of maintenance of public order during the 
nineteenth century. The take-over of internal peacekeeping by civilian police and 
gendarmeries, between 1870 and 1920, is particularly relevant in countries like 
France or Germany, where the army traditionally played a significant role as a force 
for internal order. While much attention has been paid to the development of police 
and gendarmerie in these two countries2, the role of the regular army in domestic 
peacekeeping after 1870 has scarcely been researched3. Due to the small amount of 
empirical research on the domestic role of the army of the German Empire and the 
French Third Republic, together with a lack of comparative perspective, little atten-
tion has been paid to the strikingly dissimilar development in the domestic use of 
military troops in the two countries: in the German Empire, the army came to play a 
very minor role in domestic peacekeeping between 1889 and 1914, while, during the 
same years, the French army became increasingly involved in the policing of labour 
conflicts and political protest. 
Although the development in France can partly be accounted for by the instable 
social and political situation of the early Third Republic, for comparison of the con-
flicts occurring in the two countries as well as the conflicts to which the army was 
mobilised between 1889 and 1914 show that there was only partial correlation 
between the level of unrest and the response in terms of law-and-order measures. In 
fact, the vast majority of military interventions in France concerned very minor inci-
dents of unrest or merely potential unrest. At the same time, given the significantly 
larger industries and comparatively well-organised workforce, the great labour con-
flicts that took place in Germany comprised many more strikers than the most 
extended conflicts occurring in France 4. 
The propositions in the literature are of little help in explaining why such dis-
similar policies were pursued. The literature on policing in Germany generally 
agrees that the policy of de-militarising protest policing was the project of the 
Prussian Ministry of the Interior and the leaders of the provincial administration as 
2
 Lüdtke (1982); Spencer (1984; 1985; 1992) Funk (1986); Jessen (1991; 1992). In France, policing 
of the early Third Republic has been looked into primarily by Berlière (1991; 1996), Bruneteaux 
(1993; 1996) and Carrot (1984). 
3
 The principal works on policing and maintenance of order in early Third Republic, Berlière (1991; 
1996) and Bruneteaux (1993; 1996) deal with the role of the army in a few pages. Carrot (1984) con-
centrates on legal and organisational aspects of maintenance of order, while Jauffret (1983), 
Bruneteaux (1993) and Berlière (1996) all focus on the political debates about the establishment of 
a specialised force to take over tasks of ensuring public order. As for the literature on maintenance of 
order in the German states, Lüdtke's study (1982) concentrates on the first half of the century. Jessen 
(1991; 1992) works on policing in Westphalia 1848-1914, but deals only marginally with the role of 
the army. Klückmann (1978) analyses the legal framework around military involvement, while Funk 
(1986), Henning (1987) and Deist (1991) focus on the policies of de-militarisation pursued by the 
Prussian Ministry of the Interior and War Ministry, with little attention to how these were imple-
mented in practice. 
4
 Boll (1992); Johansen (1998). In Germany, the large miners' strikes mobilised 90 000 miners in 
1889, 200 000 in 1905, and 190 000 in 1912. By contrast, even the most extended strikes in the 
French mining industry mobilised only 86 000 in 1906 and 130 000 in 1912. In 1906, which was the 
most turbulent year in France, there were 438 000 registered strikers, whilst in Germany there were 
526 000 registered strikers in 1905 and 481 000 in 1912. Only the widespread protests in southern 
France during the summer of 1907 were joined by a larger number of people than any incident occur-
ring in Germany. 
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opposed to local forces calling for significant display of military force against strik-
ers and demonstrators 5. The attempts to avoid military involvement were justified 
with the argument that the army with its inflexible military means of repression was 
unfit for handling sensitive conflicts : soldiers lacked personal authority and could 
easily proceed to violent actions ; moreover, the very presence of military troops 
posed a risk of provoking violent confrontations with protesters. Similarly, it was 
argued that the use of the national army against citizens created a risk of undermin-
ing the legitimacy of the State6. In the literature, the de-militarisation of the internal 
peacekeeping in Germany is thus explained with reference to a series of practical 
and ideological considerations. It is nevertheless worth noting that the same argu-
ments were put forward in the French National Assembly, in the public debate, and 
by the French military establishment7; this was not, however, of much consequence 
since the army was called upon with increasing frequency. This is all the more sur-
prising since the alleged negative effects of the use of the army were potentially 
more damaging for the liberal French Republic than for the comparatively authori-
tarian Prussian-German system 8. 
Interpretations of the domestic role of the army in France and Germany focus 
primarily on the governmental policies adopted for a few notorious incidents. This 
seems justified for Germany, where central government authorities became involved 
in almost all cases of domestic military intervention9. In France, however, the focus 
on governmental actions in a few big conflicts does not take into consideration that 
the majority of incidents that triggered military intervention were rather limited con-
flicts comprising less than a thousand participants ; moreover, the disturbance of the 
'public order' was in many cases only potential. 
The comparison of the diverging developments in France and Germany opens the 
question of who was responsible for the increasing use of troops for small-scale 
unrest. Given that, in both countries, the mobilisation of the army against protesters 
or striking workers was most often to the advantage of local political elites and indus-
trial interests, the degree of local influence on the use of troops needs to be investi-
gated. This article will therefore look at the question of whether the extremely 
frequent calls for military assistance in France was due - at least to some degree - to 
difficulties experienced by the French central government and provincial administra-
tion in controlling the municipal authorities' use of their legal right to request military 
protection. This question is all the more relevant since, in France as well as in 
Germany, the call for military protection had previously, in the 19 t h century, been dealt 
with primarily between local garrison commanders and municipal authorities, which 
were closely connected with - if not entirely controlled by - local industrial elites 1 0. 
5
 Henning (1987) ;Jessen (1991); Spencer (1985; 1992). 
6
 Funk(1986, pp.155-156); Jessen (1991, pp. 77-79); Spencer (1992, pp. 86-87). 
7
 Jauffret (1983, pp. 111-115); Bruneteaux (1993, pp. 33-35); Bruneteaux (1996, pp. 44-49). 
8
 As Hobsbawm argues, « Governments, especially those who had to worry about public opinion and 
their electors, were usually careful about facing troops with the risk of shooting down their fellow 
citizens, since the political consequences of soldiers firing on civilians were apt to be bad». 
Hobsbawm (1997, p. 305). 
9
 The miners' strike of 1889 and 1893; the Polish riot of 1899; the Mansfelder strike of 1909; the 
Westphalian miners' strike of 1912 and the Zabern Affair of 1913. 
1 0
 Lüdtke (1982) has demonstrated this for the first half of the century. Similarly, Perrot (1975) shows the 
significant involvement of local elites in French labour confrontations during the period 1870-1890. 
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The article looks at the two areas in France and Germany which had the highest 
frequency of military interventions between 1889 and 1914: the Prussian province 
of Westphalia, with the industrial areas around the Ruhr River, and the two French 
départements, 'Nord' and 'Pas-de-Calais'. It seeks to demonstrate that neither in 
Westphalia nor in Nord-Pas-de-Calais was the use of troops shaped by direct or indi-
rect actions from local politicians, pressure groups or industrial magnates. In fact, in 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais as well as in Westphalia, it was the most senior state adminis-
trators at the départemental or provincial level, who came to be entirely in charge of 
decisions concerning the use of troops through effective exclusion of municipal 
authorities. Moreover, the case study shows that, in both areas, the senior state 
administrators were in a position to implement policing measures against the 
explicit wishes or vigorous protests from local politicians and pressures groups. 
THE DISSIMILAR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DOMESTIC ROLE 
OF THE FRENCH AND THE PRUSSIAN ARMIES 
Until the 1880s-1890s, military troops had played a significant role in the imple-
mentation of law-and-order measures in both France and Germany, and in many 
areas it was the only law enforcement agency. During the 1870s, voices within the 
French and German military establishments as well as the left wing opposition 
began to raise questions about the future role of the army as a force of internal order. 
However, it was only in the 1890s that the domestic role of the army became a polit-
ical issue and the practices in the two countries took diverging trajectories. 
In Germany, the policy of de-militarisation of maintenance of order emerged in 
the wake of the great miners' strike of 1889. Between 1889 and 1914, a mere 
twenty-seven incidents are recorded by the Prussian War Ministry and Ministry of 
the Interior in which military troops were either mobilised or simply kept ready to 
intervene to maintain or restore public order 1 1. As for Westphalia, troops were 
mobilised on only three occasions between 1889 and 1914 1 2. 
In France, attempts to limit the role of the army as a force of internal order 
were made in Paris after 1893, when Louis Lépine became police prefect. 
Although Lépine aimed at handling most situations with police and gendarmerie 
alone, he still requested military assistance on numerous occasions to control 
demonstrations 1 3. Outside Paris military troops were used with increasing frequency 
from the late 1880s until after the First World War. Contemporary observers and his-
torians have been split in their judgement of successive governments' use of troops. 
Interior Ministers and heads of government, from Freycinet to Clemenceau and 
Briand, justified their use of military troops by the necessity of using strong mea-
sures to maintain the authority of a fragile republican regime, particularly after the 
Dreyfus Affair, when the regime was challenged by both from the revolutionary left 
and the anti-republican right. If indeed there was in France a tradition for violent 
1 1
 These cases take in the entire German Empire except Bavaria. A slightly higher figure is reached by 
Richard Tilly. By scrutinising the German press, he identifies forty-eight incidents for the entire 
German Empire from 1882 to 1913. Tilly, Tilly & Tilly (1975, p. 226). 
1 2
 The great miners' strike of May 1889, the riots in Herne in 1899, and the miners' strike of March 
1912. 
1 3
 Berl ière(1993aetb). 
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protest 1 4, the ways in which the army was used on several occasions between 1901 
and 1914 could only be described as resulting from the determination of successive 
governments to break the power of the trades unions and the Catholic Church 1 5 . The 
role of the army included not only repeated bloody intervention against strikers 1 6, 
but also the use of conscript soldiers as strike-breakers 1 7 and highly inventive inter-
pretation of the military legislation by which striking rail workers were sent back to 
work 1 8 . 
These incidents are only the tip of the iceberg, however ; the use of soldiers for 
domestic purposes went much further. Alone in the two départements, Nord and 
Pas-de-Calais, the army was called upon on no less than seventy-eight occasions 
between 1889 and 1914 1 9. Apart from major strikes or politically sensitive events 
(political protest, religious processions), the majority of incidents for which soldiers 
were mobilised were simple public gatherings of a large number of people, where 
the challenge to the public order was and remained 'potential' (e.g. visits of VIPs ; 
public executions, public festivals, fairs, horse races or air shows). 
If troops were called upon more frequently in Nord-Pas-de-Calais than in 
Westphalia, this was not because the French authorities had fewer police and gen-
darmerie forces at their disposal. Apart from the army, there were three types of 
forces of public order. Urban communities were policed by municipal police forces 
under the authority of mayors, or city mayors in larger towns. By 1889, the ratio of 
inhabitants per municipal policeman in the industrial cities of the Ruhr was inferior 
to the standards of French towns, including the industrial cities in Nord-Pas-de-
Calais 2 0 . Although the number of municipal policemen in Westphalia increased sig-
nificantly between 1889 and 1914, the rapid growth of the population in the 
industrial cities largely neutralised the increase in municipal police forces ; and by 
the outbreak of the First World War, the industrial towns in Nord-Pas-de-Calais were 
still generally better provided with municipal policemen compared to the population 
than the Westphalian towns. 
The supplementary forces were also crucial for the maintenance of order. In both 
Prussia and France, the gendarmerie, primarily in charge of policing rural areas, also 
functioned as an additional force to be mobilised to any part of the country in case 
of major unrest. In addition, there were the state police. The Prussian state police 
1 4
 Tilly (1986) ; Moscovici (1981) ; Erlanger (1968, pp. 356-370) ; Wormser (1961, pp. 211-225). 
1 5
 Agulhon (1990, p. 219); Serman (1982, pp. 58-63); Rebénoux (1975, pp. 111-113); Julliard (1965). 
1 6
 Nine striking workers were killed at Fourmies in 1891; in 1900, three were killed at Chalon-sur-
Saône, whilst another three strikers were killed at Longwy in 1905 ; two demonstrators were killed 
in the widespread protests during the spring of 1906, and six were killed during the protests in south-
ern France in the summer of 1907; finally, six strikers were killed at Draveil-Vigneux and 
Villeneuve-Saint-Georges in 1908. 
1 7
 In 1907, during a strike among electricians, soldiers were ordered to replace the strikers in order to 
ensure the basic service; this also happened during a major strike among postal workers in 1909 and 
a strike among gas workers in Tourcoing in 1911. Similarly, during a strike among dustmen in Lille, 
soldiers were called out to remove the rubbish. 
1 8
 During a nationwide strike among rail workers in October-November 1910, many of the strikers 
were called up as army reservists and then sent back to work as soldiers under military law. 
1 9
 This is only a minimum figure. The actual number is likely to be significantly higher (Johansen 
1998). 
2 0
 Comparison based on the figures provided by Jessen (1991), Carrot (1984), and Berlière (1991 ; 
1996). 
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(the Royal Guards), not only policed an increasing number of cities, they also func-
tioned as a supplementary force of riot police. However, the Prussian state police 
together with the Prussian gendarmerie comprised only 22 500 men on the eve of the 
First World War, whilst the French gendarmerie alone constituted a force of 26 000 
men. Moreover, there were in France 5 000 Republican Guards and 8 000-10 000 
state police operating in Paris, Lyon and, from 1908, in Marseille as well. Thus, both 
in total numbers and in proportion to the population, French towns and rural areas 
were better provided with police and gendarmerie. 
MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES AND THE CONTROL OF CIVIL 
AND MILITARY FORCES OF ORDER 
The police, the gendarmerie and the army were the instruments for implement-
ing very restrictive definitions of 'public order'. According to both French and 
Prussian legislations, gatherings in public without special permission from a public 
authority could at any time be declared illegal by the police authorities 2 1. Thus, any 
public manifestation (spontaneous or organised gathering, meeting or protest 
march) could be broken up by the police without further explanation. In Germany, 
traffic regulations were also frequently used to force people away from streets and 
squares. By 1890, the workers' right to organise and to strike was recognised in both 
countries; however, severe restrictions were imposed on the actions of striking 
workers. The police and gendarmerie were supposed not only to intervene against 
attacks on strike-breakers and sabotage against private property, but also to impede 
picketing, marches or the gathering of strikers in front of their workplace. Similarly, 
law-and-order measures could also be used to prevent strikers from trying to make 
workers from other companies join the action. Influence over the policing measures 
was therefore a major resource in the contest of strength between employers and 
employees. 
In Westphalia, the employers clearly had the upper hand. Due to the Prussian 
three-class voting system, Westphalian municipal authorities were almost entirely 
controlled by the wealthy bourgeoisie, whereby the industrial elites kept a firm grip 
on the use of municipal police forces. At the same time, mining companies and 
factory owners could implement their own measures to ensure order at their plant or 
factory through private security corps or even privately hired gendarmes22. In event 
that labour conflicts went beyond the municipal borders, policing measures were 
established in close cooperation between municipal authorities and the state admin-
istration, which was in charge of the distribution of Royal Guards and gendarmes 
between the municipalities. Mayors of the main industrial towns thereby acquired 
influence on the policing measures of not only their own town but indeed of the 
wider district and province. Thus, the connection between capital interests and 
policing was conspicuous. As for requisition of military troops, both French and 
Prussian legislations formally empowered municipal authorities to call upon the 
army. Within the Prussian system, the army could be approached at four levels: by 
2 1
 The French law of 7 June 1848 on gathering in public; the Prussian law of 30 December 1798 on 
police and military intervention, and the Prussian law of 11 March 1850 on police administration. 
2 2
 Jessen (1991, pp. 119-126; 1992, pp. 161-171); Spencer (1984, p. 64). 
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the state governor of a province (Oberpräsident), of a district (Regierungs-
präsident), or of a county (Landrat) ; at the municipal level, the army could be called 
upon by the mayor, the city major, or by the municipal police master 2 3. However, in 
the event of military involvement, the direct influence on policing measures disap-
peared because all authority over civilian as well as military forces was then trans-
ferred to the military authorities 2 4. 
Even if the French system also placed the local police and gendarmerie under the 
municipal authorities, French mayors were more easily challenged in their position 
than their Prussian counterparts because their authority over the local police and 
gendarmerie could be withdrawn at any moment by the prefect 2 5. As in the Prussian 
system, French legislation granted the right to call upon the army to a series of 
public officials at the municipal level : the mayor, the mayor's assistant, as well as 
any police officer or gendarme26. However a requisition issued by any of these 
authorities could at any time be invalidated either by the sub-prefect at the level of 
arrondissements, or directly by the prefect. Once the prefect took over the responsi-
bility for law-and-order measures, the mayors were stripped of their authority over 
any police measure. French municipal authorities could therefore implement law-
and-order measures only as long as the prefect did not intervene. 
Until the 1880s-1890s, when protests in Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais 
rarely exceeded the municipal boundaries, rarely lasted for more than an few days, 
and seldom comprised more than a couple hundred protesters, decisions to call for 
military troops were generally taken by the mayor together with the local police 
master, and requisitions were addressed directly to the commander of the nearest 
garrison 2 7. When comparing the dissimilar development of the use of troops in 
France and Germany, it is worth noting that, during the 1890s, the municipal author-
ities in Westphalia as well as in Nord-Pas-de-Calais were effectively hindered in 
using their formal right to call upon military assistance. Instead, decision-making 
concerning involvement of the army as well as contact with the military authorities 
became concentrated at the level of Oberpräsidents and Regierungspräsidents, in 
Westphalia, and by the prefects, in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. 
CONCENTRATION OF DECISION-MAKING IN WESTPHALIA 
Formally, the heads of the provincial state administration never succeeded in 
obtaining that requisitions for military assistance pass through them 2 8 ; nor could an 
Oberpräsident or a Regierungspräsident intervene against a requisition issued by a 
2 3
 Law of 30 December 1798; Prussian Constitution of 31 January 1850, Article 36. 
2 4
 Cabinet Order of 17 October 1820. 
2 5
 Law of 5 April 1884 on municipal powers, Article 99. 
2 6
 Laws of 27 July-3 August 1791; Instructions of 20-31 August 1907 on the requisition of military 
troops. 
2 7
 Lüdtke (1982); Girardet (1953). Even for very serious matters such as the declaration of a military 
state of siege in Bielefeld 1885, these were the decision-making authorities. 
2 8
 According to a governmental instruction of 31 December 1825, the requisitions were supposed to go 
through the Oberpräsident, but this rule had never been seriously enforced. The Prussian 
Constitution of 31 January 1850 stated that troops could be requested by the 'civilian authorities' 
without specifying. 
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local authority and followed by a military commander because, the moment a requi-
sition was issued by a competent authority, any decision to end the military involve-
ment depended on the army authorities. After the turn of the 20th century, examples 
can still be found of mayors or police masters addressing requisitions directly to a 
local garrison commander 2 9. However, if the senior state administrators failed in 
their attempts to prevent local authorities from issuing requisitions, the execution of 
these were effectively obstructed by succeeding army-corps commanders, who 
forbade their subordinates mobilising troops without their explicit order. 
By the great Westphalian miners' strike of 1889, the initial requisitions were still 
issued by mayors, police masters or the Landrat. However, in May 1889, due to the 
extent of the conflict, involving a large number of administrative units, the co-ordi-
nation and management of law-and-order measures were soon taken over by the 
Oberpräsident and the army-corps commander of the Westphalian province. After 
1889, some of the senior commanders became increasingly reluctant to deliver 
troops to act as an extended police force. Fighting against unarmed workers in the 
streets was not considered appropriate for a professional army and was regarded as 
degrading for the prestige of the army 3 0 . 
Accordingly, successive army-corps commanders began to complain about 
requisitions from local authorities. The desire to limit the use of the army for main-
tenance of order was strongly expressed by General von Albedyll, who had been 
responsible for the 1889 military intervention in Westphalia. After the end of the 
strike, he declared, in a letter to the Kaiser, that the use of the army as an extended 
police force needed to be strictly limited; otherwise the army would spend all their 
time and resources on policing internal conflicts 3 1. Similarly, the army-corps com-
mander in the Rhine Province, General von Loë, describes the ordinary procedure 
concerning requisition of troops as being that the Landrat, the Regierungspräsident 
or the Oberpräsident addressed their requisitions directly to the army-corps com-
mander. Only in exceptional situations with special permission from the army-corps 
commander, could a Landrat be allowed to issue a requisition directly to the nearest 
garrison 3 2. General von Loë, like General von Albedyll, complained that local 
authorities deliberately exaggerated problems and that the officers wasted time and 
energy coming to rescue municipal police forces when there was no real threat of 
serious trouble 3 3. 
Therefore, if army-corps commanders agreed with the Westphalian 
Oberpräsidents about one thing, it was to keep the mayors' and police masters' use 
of their right to requisition under strict control. During the following decade, senior 
2 9
 Jessen (1991, pp. 133-134). 
3 0
 In 1895, when provoked by Bebel, War Minister Walter Bronsart von Schellendorff declared in the 
Reichstag that the army preferred to fight a foreign enemy rather than being involved in dishonour-
ing street-fights against striking workers. Similarly, during the Hamberg dockers' strike 1896-1897, 
General von Waldersee expressed his displeasure at letting his men fighting in the streets against 
hungry workers. Waldersee (1922) diary notes of 2. December 1896. 
3 1
 Münster Hauptstaatsarchiv (MHStA), OP 2847b, documents 8-9. Letter of 1 July 1889 from General 
von Albedyll to William II. 
3 2
 Letter of 24 April 1890 from General von Loë to General von Waldersee. Waldersee (1927, pp. 367-
368). 
3 3
 Letter of 24 April 1890 from General von Loë to General von Waldersee. Waldersee (1927, pp. 367-
368). Letter of 11 March 1889 from General von Albedyll to General von Waldersee. Waldersee 
(1927, pp. 288-289). 
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commanders increasingly insisted on leaving no room for local decision-making 
when the army were involved and would accept being approached by civil authori-
ties only at the level of the Oberpräsident or Regierungspräsident. The same deter-
mination was shown by General von Bissing in 1904, when the Westphalian 
Oberpräsident and the Minister of the Interior suggested that civil and military 
authorities should determine in advance to which garrison each Landrat in the Ruhr 
area were to address a requisition in the case of extreme urgency. The army-corps 
commander refused even to consider the question, arguing that allowing requisi-
tions to be made at the level of the Landrat directly to a local garrison was a blow to 
his authority as army-corps commander 3 4. General von Bissing insisted that, if a 
local military commander received a requisition from a Landrat or mayor, he had to 
ask the army-corps commander for permission to mobilise. As army-corps com-
mander, General von Bissing would then contact the Oberpräsident in order to 
check the seriousness of the case and the appropriateness of intervening with mili-
tary troops. The Oberpräsident could then issue a requisition by his own authority 
or leave it to the military apparatus to refuse delivering the requested troops. 
Accordingly, bureaucratic procedures developed whereby the order to mobilise 
troops came from the army-corps commander only after having been requested 
directly by the Oberpräsident or a Regierungspräsident. This pattern can already be 
observed in practice in June 1899, when the army intervened against rioting Polish 
miners in Herne. Only when a requisition was issued by the Oberpräsident, did the 
general commander, von Mikush-Buckberg, send troops to the area under the 
command of a colonel, who then determined the details in consultation with the 
mayor of Heme and the local police authorities. On the occasion of the miners' 
strike of 1912, local pressures to call for military assistance were addressed to the 
Regierungspräsidents of Arnsberg and of Münster. However, it was only when these 
two senior administrators, together with the Oberpräsident of Westphalia, decided 
to issue a requisition that contacts were taken to the military authorities. The effec-
tiveness of the bureaucratic obstructions through the military hierarchy can be seen 
from the few incidents of military intervention that took place after 1889, despite 
requests from mayors or local police authorities for military protection. It is also 
worth noting that, during the miners' strike of 1905, the senior state administrators 
were capable of obstructing military intervention against the clear wishes of numer-
ous municipal authorities. 
THE PREFECTORAL TAKE-OVER OF LAW-AND-ORDER MEASURES 
IN NORD-PAS-DE-CALAIS 
Against the background of the more frequent use of troops in Nord-Pas-de-
Calais compared to Westphalia, it is important to note that, in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, a 
similar transfer of authority from municipal authorities to the prefect can be 
observed during the 1890s. 
Contrary to the Germany system, the institutional marginalisation of the munic-
ipal authorities in questions concerning requisition of military troops was not due to 
MHStA, OP 6095, document 71. Letter of 6 April 1906 from General von Bissing to the 
Oberpräsident of Westphalia. 
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military obstruction. Even if members of the French military establishment did have 
professionally motivated reservations about their role as an extended police force 3 5, 
they were not in a position to effectively obstruct this use of the army, since French 
military commanders at all levels were obliged, under criminal law, to follow a 
requisition issued by any competent civil authority 3 6. By contrast, the prefect was 
empowered to invalidate or modify requisitions issued by any municipal authority 3 7. 
No military intervention could therefore take place against the prefect's will. During 
the 1890s, prefects increasingly tended to take over law-and-order measures con-
cerning any potentially sensitive situation. Contrary to Westphalia, where municipal 
authorities had some influence on law-and-order measures through their coopera-
tion with the Oberpräsident and Regierungspräsident, in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the 
intervention of the prefects always meant exclusion of municipal authorities and 
local police forces. 
There were several reasons for the increasing tendency of the prefects in Lille 
and Arras to take over the responsibility for law-and-order measures, particularly 
when the army was involved. In the widest perspective, the prefectoral take-over of 
law-and-order measures has to be seen against the background of the fragile politi-
cal position of the republican regime during and after the Dreyfus Affair. 
Challenged both from the anti-republican right and from the trades unions on the 
left, both the central government and the regional administration became very eager 
to propose what they perceived as necessary measures to keep unrest under control. 
The municipal police was seen by the state administration as too weak and incom-
petent to effectively ensure public order and manage sensitive situations 3 8; prefects 
therefore generally preferred to rely on the gendarmerie - and to an increasing 
extent also on the army. 
The lack of confidence in the strength and professional capacities of the munic-
ipal police was paired with the suspicion that the actions of municipal police were 
strongly biased towards the wishes of whoever was in charge of city hall. This 
problem was particularly acute in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, where the political orienta-
tions varied significantly between municipalities dominated by a conservative-
minded bourgeoisie of notables supported by the industrial elites, and municipalities 
with a population consisting primarily of industrial workers, where the prevailing 
political forces were radical or socialist. In municipalities controlled by conserva-
tive forces, any form of protest would often be met with heavy-handed police inter-
vention. This blatant lack of neutrality on the part of the local police was a problem 
for the prefect, in particular when he was called to arbitrate in labour conflicts. 
Accordingly, the take-over of law-and-order measures by the prefect was often jus-
tified by the importance of appearing credible as an impartial negotiator. Similar 
problems of biased police actions existed in municipalities controlled by radical or 
socialist mayors. The French state formally guaranteed the protection of persons and 
property, and the free exercise of a profession. In labour conflicts, this meant pro-
tecting property and plant installations against sabotage as well as protecting strike-
breakers against picketing strikers. Given the constant accusations from 
3 5
 Jauffret (1983) ; Serman (1982, pp. 45-63). 
3 6
 French Criminal Code Article 114. 
3 7
 Law of 5 April 1884 on municipal authorities, Article 99. 
3 8
 Berlière (1996) p.23. 
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anti-republican forces that the Republic equalled chaos and anarchy, it was essential 
for the central government and its administration to demonstrate their preparedness 
and ability to protect both private property and strike-breakers. In municipalities 
where radicals or socialists were in charge of city hall, the tendency of the local 
police to show a rather lenient attitude towards the actions of striking workers 
fuelled these accusations. Suspicious of the political neutrality of municipal police 
forces, the prefects often preferred to take over the responsibility for law-and-order 
measures in sensitive conflicts. 
Similarly linked to the fragmented political landscape between municipalities, 
was the problem of consistency in policing measures when a conflict extended to 
other areas. Strikes in the major industrial sectors (mining, textile, construction or 
transport) would typically concern a great number of companies or factories within 
a wide territory covering several municipalities, many of which were not directly 
affected by the strike. Groups of striking workers would often move from one area 
to another, trying to make the workers of other mines or factories join the conflict. A 
major strike would therefore directly or indirectly affect the majority of municipal-
ities within the district. In situations of conflicts going beyond the municipal bound-
aries, the mayors' right to call for military protection became particularly 
detrimental; some mayors would call for military protection, while others would do 
their best to implement only the most basic policing measures, depending on the 
political majority within each community. The only way of avoiding total chaos, 
when a conflict extended over several municipalities, was for the prefect to strip the 
municipal authorities of their authority over the municipal police and take charge of 
all law-and-order measures 3 9. When the prefect took over the law-and-order mea-
sures, he had to face criticism both from mayors complaining that the policing mea-
sures were insufficient, and from mayors protesting vigorously against the sending 
of gendarmes or soldiers to their community 4 0. 
On the other hand, when it came to involving the army, the prefect's position was 
strengthened by increasing reluctance of municipal authorities to use their formal 
right to request military protection directly from the local garrison. There were both 
political and financial reasons for this. Mayors who built their political position on 
the wealthy notables were under strong pressures from their electorate to call for 
effective protection against riots in the streets; they were constantly at risk of being 
criticised for not having done enough if a situation got out of control, and citizens 
with property might demand compensation if their property was damaged. On the 
other hand, not only striking workers but also groups not involved in the conflict 
tended to complain about the expense and consider the call for the army to be a 
costly and exaggerated measure. All mayors, irrespective of their political orienta-
tion, were confronted with the problem that, no matter which law-and-order mea-
sures they implemented, the municipality were at risk of ending up with a huge bill: 
according to the 1884 law on local government, municipal authorities were not only 
obliged to finance a local police force, but were also financially responsible for 
Haupt (1986, p. 246); Cooper-Richet (1987, p. 409). 
In October 1902, for instance, when the miners from the entire region went on strike, the mayor of 
Béthune and the surrounding suburban municipalities urged the prefect of Pas-de-Calais to request 
military assistance. On the other hand, the mayor of Avion, who was from the French Labour Party, 
as well as the socialist mayors of Lens and Denain, protested vigorously against the idea of military 
intervention and threatened to resign if troops were called upon. 
64 ANJA JOHANSEN 
damages to public and private property if the mayor had not used all his legal 
resources to ensure the maintenance of public order 4 1. Even left-wing mayors there-
fore had to weigh the costs of protection against the costs of covering the possible 
damages in case of violent attacks on public and private property. If, by contrast, 
gendarmes or troops were mobilised on the initiative of the prefect, it was the French 
state that became financially responsible both for the extra wages to the officers and 
for possible damages to public and private property 4 2. Then the municipalities had 
only to provide accommodation and food for the men and horses. Mayors who 
wanted to obtain military protection therefore often did not call directly upon the 
army, but instead sent petitions to the prefect, stressing the seriousness of the con-
flict and the potential for violent riots. 
Thus, in Nord-Pas-de-Calais as in Westphalia, the requisition of troops as well as 
the contact with the military authorities moved from the municipal authorities to the 
senior representative of the central government at the regional level. The bureau-
cratic exclusion of municipal authorities from making use of their formal right to 
call for the army was coupled with increasing hesitation on the part of municipal 
authorities to make use of their right to request military assistance. 
WESTPHALIAN OBERPRÄSIDENTS AND LOCAL ELITES 
With the concentration of decision-making in the hands of the Oberpräsident 
and Regierungspräsidents, what was the context in which these senior administra-
tors decided to handle maintenance of order with police and gendarmerie alone or to 
request military assistance? In Westphalia, the policing measures implemented in 
labour conflicts by the state administration and judiciary strongly supported the 
interests of employers and the local elites that dominated the majority of municipal-
ities. Nevertheless, the involvement of the army in the policing of social conflicts 
generally marked the limits of the extent to which the senior administrators in 
Westphalia were willing to go in their support of industrial interests. 
At every major strike in the mining and steel industry, pressures would be placed 
on the government and the state administration to mobilise the army. The pressures 
from industrialists, however, rarely proved successful. It is worth noting that the 
senior administrators in this issue were up against powerful forces because, with the 
increasingly extended and long labour conflicts of the 1890s, the costs of military 
protection became so great that only industries with strong financial capacities could 
afford to pay for military protection. Already by the time of the 1889 strike, the pow-
erful employers' association appealed in vain to the government about declaring a 
state of siege, although many of the strikebound mines - particularly those in the 
Saarland - were owned and run by the state 4 3. During the 1890s, even the otherwise 
very powerful Central Association of German Manufacturers - representing heavy 
industry and mining - faced increasing difficulties in persuading the heads of the 
provincial administration to provide military protection for their plants and workers. 
Similarly unsuccessful were the attempts of individual mining companies to obtain 
4 1
 Law of 5 April 1884 on municipal powers, Articles 106 and 108. 
4 2
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permanent military guards at their plants or frequent military patrols 4 4. In 1905, the 
mining companies appealed in vain to the provincial governor of Westphalia and 
directly to the government to provide an impressive show of military force, and by 
the time of the great miners' strike in March 1912, troops were mobilised only when 
the senior state administrators saw no other way of preventing violence and riots, 
even if the mining companies had sought to obtain military protection before the 
conflict broke out 4 5. 
The repeated refusal to accommodate the needs of industrialists indicates the 
strong position of senior state administrators in relation to industrial pressure 
groups. Senior state administrators were appointed by the Minister of the Interior 
and were responsible only to the government in Berlin. As members of the Prussian 
civil service, they also tended to display a very assertive attitude towards local elites 
and locally elected authorities, particularly when these were bourgeois rather than 
traditional landed nobility 4 6. Confronted with demands for military protection for 
employers in labour conflicts, senior state administrators were often eager to 
demonstrate that their decisions were independent from private and capital inter-
ests 4 7 . 
At the same time, a change of attitude towards labour conflicts can be seen 
among state administrators after the miners' strike of 1889. In 1889, the prevailing 
attitude among civil servants had been that strikes were unacceptable and that a 
forceful response to any form of public disturbance was the only appropriate way of 
dealing with it. In 1889 there seem to be few senior bureaucrats, like the 
Regierungspräsident in Düsseldorf, von Berlepsch, who saw the intransigent atti-
tude of the mine-owners and their demand for military protection as an unreasonable 
pursuit of particular interests that put public order at risk and exposed the entire 
community to the threat of violence and riots 4 8. After the turn of the 20th century, 
however, this attitude is clearly discernable whenever military intervention was dis-
cussed. Scholars have noted that, during the miners' strike of 1905, senior civil ser-
vants expressed a certain sympathy and understanding for the workers' complaints, 
which they recognised as reasonable and justified 4 9. At the same time, their criticism 
of the private companies for being irresponsible in their provocation of labour con-
frontations became more pronounced. In 1905, the reports from the senior state 
administrators to the Ministry of the Interior showed a significant degree of exas-
peration with companies whose actions deliberately obstructed the policing mea-
4 4
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sures being taken by the state administration5 0, and stressed the importance of 
keeping the municipal authorities' use of troops under strict control 5 1. In their justi-
fications to the Ministry of the Interior for their refusal to yield to pressure from the 
mining companies, the Regierungspräsidents of both Münster and Düsseldorf 
declared that they did not see any reason for believing the descriptions of wide-
spread violence and riots put forward by the mining companies, and claimed that the 
requests of the mining companies for military protection were irresponsible and 
described their request for forces as highly unrealistic.52. The exasperation with 
industrialists and mayors, however, was not discernible on this occasion alone. In 
March 1912, even though troops were eventually mobilised, the senior administra-
tors still saw industrialists and mayors as working for their own particular interests, 
while disregarding the need for a peaceful settlement of the conflict 5 3. 
As long as senior administrators were supported in their priorities by the 
Ministry of the Interior and by the general commander in charge of the military 
organisation in the province, it was possible to withstand the pressures from power-
ful industrial groups. Rather than simply following the needs of industrial elites, the 
army was called upon only when senior state administrators considered that the sta-
bility of wider society was threatened by a strike movement which vastly over-
extended the capacities of the police and gendarmerie forces (i.e. the miners' strikes 
of 1889 and 1912) or protest from groups that were considered to be a serious chal-
lenge to the existing social and political order (e.g. social-democrat demonstrations; 
riots by Polish workers). 
LOCAL PRESSURES AND THE EXTENT OF PREFECTORAL AUTHORITY 
In Westphalia pressure from industrial organisations could be resisted because 
Prussian senior administrators, backed by the Ministry of the Interior, were in a posi-
tion to refuse such demands. This opens the question of the degree to which law-
and-order measures implemented by the prefects in Lille and Arras were shaped by 
informal pressures placed on the prefects by local politicians and industrialists. The 
interpretations of the degree of local influence on maintenance of order during this 
5 0
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period are split between those who stress that the strong position of the central 
power enabled them to impose law-and-order measures 5 4 and those who note that 
the prefects' sphere of action was limited by the need of weak governments to 
ensure support from local representatives in the National Assembly . A close analy-
sis of the patterns of military intervention in Nord-Pas-de-Calais seems to confirm 
that, in questions concerning maintenance of order, the prefects were in a position to 
impose their policing measures against significant opposition from local pressure 
groups. 
To be sure, prefects of the early Third Republic were often exposed to all kinds 
of pressures from local representatives : deputies, senators, mayors, and members of 
the regional council, (conseillers généraux)56. Generally, the position of the prefects 
of the Third Republic was highly uncertain, and they were easily removed from the 
post or were transferred to another département, particularly on the frequent occa-
sions of a change of Minister of the Interior. At the same time, in order to perform 
efficiently as the government's executive representative in a département, it was 
essential for the prefect to enjoy a reasonable degree of goodwill among the locally 
elected representatives. Due to the general governmental instability of the Third 
Republic and because of the ever-changing and fragile alliances in the National 
Assembly, the deputies - who were often also mayors in the most important towns -
sometimes put pressure on prefects by threatening to withdraw their support for the 
government 5 7. 
Against this background, it is worth noting that no change of prefect in the two 
départements, Nord and Pas-de-Calais can be linked to uncontrollable escalation of 
conflicts or bloody confrontations between public forces and civilians. Although 
there were repeatedly strong protests from local groups against the law-and-order 
measures implemented by successive prefects, the Nord and Pas-de-Calais show a 
remarkable degree of prefectoral stability. Together with the département of the 
Seine, these two départements had the highest degree of prefectoral stability 
between 1877 and 1958 5 8 . Despite a national average of fewer than four years in 
service for prefects in the period between 1876 and 1918, among the prefects who 
served in Pas-de-Calais between 1883 and 1918, all but one served seven years or 
more. Apart from the years 1897-1899, a similar pattern of prefectoral stability can 
be observed in the Nord. Moreover, one can observe that in several cases the same 
prefects served first in Pas-de-Calais and were then promoted to the particularly dif-
ficult département Nord 5 9 . The remarkable degree of prefectoral stability indicates 
that succeeding Ministers of the Interior were more inclined to maintain a strong 
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prefect, someone who could impose himself in a difficult region, rather than to sac-
rifice him for the sake of political alliances in the National Assembly 6 0. With the 
support of the Minister of the Interior, the prefects seemed to be in a sufficiently 
strong position to impose their measures even against vigorous protests from local 
authorities and representatives. 
Similarly, a highly consistent pattern can be observed in the prefects' use of mil-
itary troops. If the use of troops to police strikes and popular protest had been 
heavily influenced by pressures from local representatives, one would expect a 
pattern in which the policing measures changed significantly from one conflict to 
another. By contrast, the high level of consistency indicates that, even if some 
mayors called for strong measures against disturbers of the public order, while 
others repeatedly protested against the use of the army against strikers and demon-
strators, the prefect was capable of imposing his measures. Given that mayors of the 
larger towns were often also deputies in the National Assembly and had the poten-
tial to act directly on governmental policies, is all the more surprising that the dra-
matic increase in the number of military interventions occurred during the 
centre-left governments after 1899; these governments depended more than any 
previous government on the support of political groups that were the most likely to 
oppose military intervention. Despite repeated vigorous and widespread protests 
against the way in which troops were used in the contest of strength between the 
government and the trades unions as well as the implementation of anti-Catholic 
legislation, the prefects, backed by successive Ministers of the Interior, managed to 
impose highly unpopular policing measures 6 1. 
Finally, if prefects called upon the army in order to accommodate the needs of 
particular pressure groups, this should be discernible in a bias towards particular 
types of conflicts. In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, however, troops were called for all types 
of conflicts of all sizes. Large-scale strikes in crucial industrial sectors (e.g. strikes 
among miners, dock workers, rail workers or major confrontations in the textile 
industry) and politically sensitive events (e.g. political demonstrations, general elec-
tions, or religious processions) would almost invariably entail military involvement. 
However, the prefects also called upon the army to undertake ordinary crowd man-
agement (e.g. during the passage of French or foreign VIPs through the region, for 
the parades on Bastille Day, at public executions, cattle shows, or horse races). In a 
great number of cases, the military authorities had already been contacted by the 
prefect when a strike or demonstration was announced. Thus, the first steps towards 
military intervention were taken so early that mayors or industrialists who might 
have had an interest in obtaining military protection hardly had the time even to ask 
for it. This indicates that the requisition of the army was not simply a measure taken 
in situations where the interests of some particular pressure group was at stake, but 
that it was an administrative measure which became entrenched in ordinary bureau-
cratic practice. 
Vincent Wright observes a similar pattern of 'isles of stability' in relation to the difficult post of 
prefect of the Seine, which was occupied for fifteen years, between 1896 and 1911, by Justin de 
Selves, and the post of police prefect of Paris, held by Louis Lépine from 1899 to 1913. Wright 
(1994, p. 299). 
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Whilst prefects implemented policing measures despite protests from local 
groups, successive prefects in Lille and Arras expressed their suspicion and criti-
cism of the intentions behind the policing measures of local authorities or private 
companies, both when these demanded military protection and when mayors 
protested against the mobilisation of troops to their community. On the one hand, 
this attitude was apparent in relation to mayors whose sympathies lay with the 
labour movement. There was little sympathy within the state administration for 
trades-unionism, which was about to establish itself outside the control of the politi-
cians in the National Assembly. In particular, the communist Confédération 
Générale du Travail, with its revolutionary tendencies, was regarded with much sus-
picion 6 2. The prefects therefore saw attempts by socialist mayors to protect strikers 
from police intervention - and ultimately from military intervention - as an irre-
sponsible policy that put public order seriously at risk 6 3. 
On the other hand, prefects showed similarly little sympathy or understanding 
for the particular interests of mine and factory owners. Already in the early 1890s, 
the prefects in Lille often complained about companies that seemed to regard the 
public forces - including the army - as their private security service. The irritation 
of the prefects at private companies was reinforced by problems of making the 
private companies, which claimed that their property had been insufficiently pro-
tected, cover their share of expenses 6 4. The suspicion and irritation of the prefects 
over local industrialists using the public forces for their own particular interests 
emerge quite strongly in the accounts provided to the Ministry of the Interior con-
cerning the events at Fourmies in 1891, when fourteen striking workers were killed 
by military troops. In a report from the special commission that had investigated the 
incident for the Ministry of the Interior, accusations against the local authorities and 
industrialists were numerous 6 5 . The blame for the disorder that had broken out 
during the May Day demonstrations was, according to the special commission, 
caused by the intransigent attitude of local industrialists towards their employees. 
The mayor and municipal counsellors - most of whom were mine or factory owners 
— were also criticised for using public forces to protect their own property, while 
showing only a semblance of consideration for the maintenance of public order 
within the rest of the community 6 6. After the turn of the century, complaints about 
private companies using public forces for particular interests were also repeatedly 
made by prefects from Nord and Pas-de-Calais during the elaboration of general 
plans for protection of public order in case of a major strike 6 7. 
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To be sure, intervention with military troops in many labour conflicts was obvi-
ously to the advantage of the employers, not only to protect the mine or factory 
installations but also to ensure the access of strike-breakers to the workplace. In a 
number of the great labour conflicts, the military intervention was aimed at protect-
ing French industry from being brought to a stand-still by a scarcity of energy, trans-
port or communication. However in the majority of labour conflicts, presence of 
military troops seems to be a side-effect of the prefects' wish for control and need 
for imposing the legal rights of strike-breakers to continue working rather than 
active attempts to support the particular interests individual industrialists. 
CONCLUSION 
Comparison of the use of military troops as an extended police force in 
Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais shows that the extremely frequent calls upon 
the army in Nord-Pas-de-Calais were not due to difficulties of the French central 
government and state administration in curtailing municipal authorities' right to 
request military assistance to municipal police. 
By different institutional means, the municipal authorities in Westphalia as well 
as in Nord-Pas-de-Calais became effectively excluded from the decision-making 
process whenever the military authorities were involved in the management of local 
conflicts. In Westphalia, where the state administration generally worked closely 
with municipal authorities on maintenance of public order, calling upon the army 
was a measure that the Oberpräsident and Regierungspräsidents were unwilling to 
implement. In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the prefects did not include municipal authori-
ties in the planning and implementation of measures to maintain public order. 
Instead, the prefects strongly tended to bypass the municipal authorities by taking 
over the entire responsibility for law-and-order measures in all potentially sensitive 
conflicts. In their implementation of policing measures, the prefects in Nord-Pas-de-
Calais were just as capable as their Westphalian counterparts of withstanding 
pressures from local politicians and industrial pressure groups to call upon the 
army or refrain from sending troops; indeed, measures were often implemented 
against the explicit wishes of otherwise influential groups and individuals. Finally, 
even if the policing measures implemented in labour conflicts were clearly to the 
advantage of the employers, the very frequent use of troops in Nord-Pas-de-Calais 
could hardly be explained as being due to the particular eagerness on the part of the 
prefects to accommodate the interests of great industrialists. Like their Westphalian 
counterparts, the prefects in Nord and Pas-de-Calais were very self-conscious, as the 
representatives of the State acting as a 'neutral' force between employers and 
employees. 
This brings the focus back to the policies of the French and German government 
and state administration. If the army was used far more frequently in Nord-Pas-de-
Calais than in Westphalia, it was successive governments and the French state 
administrations that were entirely responsible. In neither of the two regions do the 
policies of policing measures seem to be primarily a response to the wishes of local 
elites or industrial interests. In Westphalia, the policy of de-militarising the policing 
of protest and labour conflicts went directly against what industrial elites perceived 
as their interests. Similarly in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the frequent use of the army 
seems to be linked primarily to the need of the state administration to control even 
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small-scale unrest and to impose the measures of an allegedly 'neutral' state on con-
flict between opposing groups in local communities. 
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